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Abstract
This paper suggests the following approach for checking whether a program satisﬁes an information ﬂow
policy that may declassify secret information: (a) Compute a ﬁnite abstract domain that over-approximates
the information released by the policy and (b) Check whether program execution may release more infor-
mation than what is permitted by the policy by completing the ﬁnite abstract domain wrt. weakest liberal
preconditions. Moreover, techniques based on the Paige-Tarjan algorithm for partition reﬁnement can be
used to generate counterexamples to a declassiﬁcation policy: the counterexamples demonstrate that more
information is released by the program than what the policy permits. Subsequently the policy can be reﬁned
so that the least amount of conﬁdential information necessary for making the program secure is declassiﬁed.
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1 Introduction
The secure information ﬂow problem is concerned with protecting data conﬁden-
tiality by checking that secrets are not leaked during program execution. In the
simplest setting, program variables are ﬁrst partitioned into high security (or pri-
vate or classiﬁed) and low security (or public or unclassiﬁed) variables, where high
(H) and low (L) are levels in a two point security lattice, L ≤ H; next, one checks
that L output variables do not leak information about the initial values of H input
variables. To perform the check, a variety of information ﬂow analyses for conﬁ-
dentiality policies have been developed using technologies like data ﬂow analysis,
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security type systems, program logics, etc. (See the survey by Sabelfeld and My-
ers [23] and references therein). The correctness of such analyses is governed by
noninterference (NI) [13]: for any two runs of a program, L indistinguishable input
states yield L indistinguishable output states, where two program states are said to
be L indistinguishable iﬀ they agree on the values of the L variables.
Joshi and Leino [15] give a semantic deﬁnition of secure information ﬂow (that
has been shown equivalent to NI [24]): a program P containing H and L variables
(ranged over by h and l respectively) is secure iﬀ HH;P ;HH = P ;HH, where HH
is an assignment of an arbitrary value to h. “The postﬁx occurrences of HH on each
side mean that we are only interested in the ﬁnal value of l and the preﬁx HH on
the left-hand-side means that the two programs are equal if the ﬁnal value of l does
not depend on the initial value of h” [24]. In practice, noninterference is too strong
a property to be enforced and downgrading of information, or declassiﬁcation, is
a necessity. For example, a password checker makes public the (H) result of the
comparison between the actual password and the password entered at the login
prompt.
This paper is based on the central observation that Joshi and Leino’s semantic
deﬁnition permits a view of noninterference as completeness of an abstract inter-
pretation [10], and the paper explores the consequences of this observation. An
abstract interpretation is (backwards) complete for a function, f , if the result ob-
tained when f is applied to any concrete input, x, and the result obtained when
f is applied to an abstraction of the concrete input, x, both abstract to the same
value. Thus, the essence of completeness is this: an observer who can see only the
ﬁnal abstraction cannot distinguish whether the concrete input value was x or any
other concrete value x′ with the same abstract value as that of x. The completeness
connection is implicit in Joshi and Leino’s deﬁnition of secure information ﬂow and
the implicit abstraction in their deﬁnition is: “each H value is associated with ,
i.e., the set of all possible H values”. (This is discussed in Sects. 2 and 3).
In this paper, we consider more ﬂexible abstractions than the one considered
by Joshi and Leino and show that such abstractions naturally describe declassiﬁ-
cation policies that are concerned with what information is declassiﬁed [25]. Our
primary contribution (Sects. 4,5.1) is to show that “declassiﬁed NI” (DNI), i.e, NI
with a declassiﬁcation policy, is also a completeness problem: the program points
where completeness fails are the ones where some private information is leaked,
thus breaking the policy. Hence, we can mechanically check if a program satisﬁes a
declassiﬁcation policy by checking whether its semantics is complete wrt. the policy.
Moreover, we show that when a program does not satisfy a declassiﬁcation policy
(i.e, when completeness fails), (a) counterexamples that expose the failure can be
generated (Sect. 5.2); (b) there is an algorithm that generates the best reﬁnement
of the given policy such that the program respects the reﬁned policy (Sect. 5.3).
Finally, (c) we connect abstract model checking with secure information ﬂow by
showing that the absence of spurious counterexamples in the former can be under-
stood as the absence of information leaks in the latter (Sect. 6).
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2 Overview
Notational summary. VH,VL are the sets of possible H and L values. The set of
program states is Σ = VH×VL. Σ is implicitly indexed by the H variables followed
by the L variables. For any X ⊆ Σ, XH (resp. XL) is the projection of the H (resp.
L) variables. L indistinguishability of states s1, s2 ∈ Σ, written s1 =L s2, denotes
that s1, s2 agree when indexed by L variables.
Semantic noninterference a` la Joshi-Leino. We start with Joshi and Leino’s se-
mantic deﬁnition of security [15], HH;P ;HH = P ;HH, where HH assigns to h
an arbitrary value. Because of the arbitrary assignment, the semantics of HH can
be modelled as an abstraction function, H, on sets of concrete program states, Σ;
that is, H : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ), where ℘(Σ) is ordered by subset inclusion, . For each
possible value of an L variable, H associates all possible values of the H variables
in P . Thus H(X) = VH ×XL, where VH = , the top element of ℘(VH). Now the
Joshi-Leino deﬁnition can be rewritten [10] in the following way, where P  is the
concrete, denotational semantics of P .
H ◦ P  ◦ H = H ◦ P  (1)
For example, let h1, h2 ∈ {0, 1} and let l ∈ {0, 1}. Then V
H = {0, 1} × {0, 1},
V
L = {0, 1}. Consider any X ⊆ Σ; for example, let X = {〈0, 0, 1〉}, i.e., X denotes
the state where h1 = 0, h2 = 0, l = 1. Then H(X) = V
H × {1}. Let P be l := h1,
so that, P (X) = {〈0, 0, 0〉} and H(P (X)) = VH × {0}. On the other hand,
P (H(X)) = {〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 1〉} so that we have H(P (H(X))) =
V
H × {0, 1}; hence H(P (H(X))) ⊇ H(P (X)). Because H(P (H(X))) contains
triples 〈1, 0, 1〉 and 〈1, 1, 1〉 not present in H(P (X)), the dependence of l on h1
has been exposed. Thus P is insecure: for any two distinct values, 0 and 1 of h1 in
H(P (H(X))), two distinct values, 0 and 1, of l may be associated.
Declassiﬁcation. For l := h1, had the security policy allowed declassiﬁcation of h1,
the program would be secure. Equation (1) must naturally be modiﬁed by “ﬁltering”
H through a declassiﬁer, φ : ℘(VH) → ℘(VH), that provides an abstraction of the
secret inputs. The “ﬁltered” H, written Hφ, models the declassiﬁcation policy.
Thus we enforce the equality
H ◦ P  ◦ Hφ = H ◦ P  (2)
That is, P  applied to a concrete input, x, and P  applied to the abstraction of x
where the H component of x has been declassiﬁed by φ, both abstract to the same
value.
As before, let P be l := h1 and X = {〈0, 0, 1〉}. We are interested in φ’s
behavior on {〈0, 0〉}, because {〈0, 0〉} speciﬁes the values of h1, h2 in X. We
have, φ({〈0, 0〉}) = {〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉}: φ is the identity on what must be declassi-
ﬁed – we are releasing the exact value of h1 – but φ is  on what must be
protected, which explains why both 〈0, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉 appear. Now Hφ(X) =
φ{〈0, 0〉} ×XL = {〈0, 0, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉} so that P (Hφ(X)) = {〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉} and
H(P (Hφ(X))) = VH × {0}. This is equal to H(P (X)). We can show equa-
tion (2) for any X ⊆ Σ; hence l := h1 is secure. Note how φ partitions ℘(V
H) into
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blocks {〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉} (the range of 〈0, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉) and {〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉} (the range of
〈1, 0〉 and 〈1, 1〉). Intuitively, φ permits exposing distinctions between blocks at the
public output, e.g., between 〈0, 0〉 and 〈1, 0〉; in standard NI, φ’s range is  and no
distinctions should be exposed (as in the earlier example).
3 Review: Completeness of abstract interpretation
Abstract interpretation is typically formulated using Galois connections (GC) [5],
but an equivalent framework [6] which we use in this paper, uses upper closure
operators 3 . For example, in Sect. 2, H : ℘(Σ)→ ℘(Σ) deﬁned as H(X) = VH×XL,
is an upper closure operator on ℘(Σ), because H is monotone, idempotent and
extensive. We often call a closure operator an abstract domain. In particular, H is
called the output (i.e., observed) abstract domain, that ignores private information.
Likewise, Hφ in Sect. 2 is also an uco.
Completeness of abstract interpretation based static analysis has its origins in
Cousot’s work, e.g., [5,6], and means that the analysis is as expressive as possible.
The following example is taken from Schmidt’s excellent survey [26] on complete-
ness. To validate the Hoare triple, {?} y := −y;x := y+1 {isPositive(x)}, a sound
analysis may compute the precondition isNegative(y). But if able to express prop-
erties like isNonNegative and isNonPositive, a complete analysis will calculate
the weakest precondition property isNonPositive(y).
An abstract domain is complete for a concrete function, f , if the “abstract state
transition function precisely mimics the concrete state-transition function modulo
the GC between concrete and abstract domains” [26]. There exist two notions of
completeness – backward (B) and forward (F) – according as whether the concrete
and the abstract computations are compared in the abstract domain or in the con-
crete domain [11]. Formally, let C be a complete lattice and f be the concrete state
transition function, f : C → C. Abstract domain ρ is a sound abstraction for f
provided ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ  ρ ◦ f . For example, in Sect. 2, H(P (H(X))) ⊇ H(P (X)), so
H is a sound abstraction for P . Completeness is obtained by demanding equal-
ity: ρ is a B (resp. F)-complete abstraction for f iﬀ ρ ◦ f = ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ (resp.
f ◦ ρ = ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ). Completeness can be generalized to pairs (ρ, η) of abstract do-
mains: B-completeness holds for (ρ, η) when ρ ◦ f ◦ η = ρ ◦ f ; F-completeness holds
for (ρ, η) when ρ ◦ f ◦ η = f ◦ η (see [12] for details). For example, in Sect. 2, the de-
classiﬁcation example asserts that equation (2) holds, i.e., (H,Hφ) is B-complete for
P . Algorithms for completing abstract domains exist – see [12,11] and Schmidt’s
survey [26] for details. Basically, F-completeness is obtained by adding all the
direct images of f to the output abstract domain; B-completeness is obtained by
adding all the maximal of the inverse images of the function to the input domain
(see Appendix A for details).
3 An upper closure operator (uco) ρ : C → C on a poset C is monotone, idempotent, and extensive, i.e.,
∀x ∈ C. x ≤C ρ(x). The set of all upper closure operators on C is denoted by uco(C).
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4 F-completeness and satisfaction of conﬁdentiality
policies
Equations (1) and (2) give us a way to dynamically check whether a program satis-
ﬁes a conﬁdentiality policy: indeed, both equations use the denotational semantics
of a program in the process. But can we do this check statically?
We will see presently that static checking involves F-completeness, instead of
B-completeness, and the use of weakest liberal preconditions instead of the deno-
tational semantics. With weakest liberal preconditions, (written WlpP ), equation
(1) has the following equivalent reformulation:
H ◦WlpP ◦ H = WlpP ◦ H (3)
Equation (3) says that H is F-complete for WlpP . In other words: consider the
abstraction of a concrete input state, X, via H; this yields a set of states where
the private information is abstracted to “any possible value”. The equation asserts
that WlpP (H(X)) is a ﬁxpoint of H, meaning that WlpP (H(X)) yields a set of
states where each public input is associated with any possible private input: a
further abstraction of the ﬁxpoint (c.f., the lhs of equation (3)) yields nothing new.
Because no distinctions among private inputs get exposed to an observer, the public
output is independent of the private input. Hence equation (3) asserts standard NI.
The following theorem asserts that the two ways of describing noninterference
by means of B- and F-completeness are equivalent.
Theorem 4.1 H ◦ P  ◦H = H ◦ P  iﬀ H ◦WlpP ◦H = WlpP ◦H.
Proof. By [11,12] we know that, if f is additive, then for any ρ we have ρ ◦ f ◦ρ =
ρ ◦ f iﬀ ρ ◦ f+ ◦ ρ = f+ ◦ ρ. By [4] we have that P + = WlpP . Choosing H, P  as
ρ, f resp., we are done. 





⎣ if h1 = h2 then l := h1 + h2
else l := h1 − h2 + 1;




〈h1, h2, 1〉 → {〈h1, h2〉} × V
L
〈h1, h2, l〉 → ∅ l = 1
The public output l is always 1, hence P is secure, as the following calculation
shows. Given VH × {l} ∈ H, we can prove that B-completeness for P  holds:
H(P (VH × {l})) = H(VH × {1}) = VH × {1} = H(〈h1, h2, 1〉) = H(P (〈h1, h2, l〉))
F-completeness for WlpP holds also:
H(WlpP (V
H × {1})) = H(VH × VL) = VH × VL = WlpP (V
H × {1})
H(WlpP (V
H × {l = 1})) = H(∅) = ∅ = WlpP (V
H × {l = 1})
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5 Completeness and Declassiﬁed NI (DNI)
When does a program P satisfy noninterference declassiﬁed by φ? Consider any




2 denote the secret
values in s1, s2 that are declassiﬁed by φ and suppose that the distinction between
the declassiﬁed values is not exposed in the two runs of P , i.e, φ(sH1) = φ(s
H
2). Then
P satisﬁes noninterference declassiﬁed by φ provided P (s1) =L P (s2). Formally:




2) ⇒ P (s1) =L P (s2)




The discussion in the previous section has not motivated why we might want WlpP
and this is what we proceed to do in the context of declassiﬁcation.
Consider secrets h1, h2 ∈ {0, 1} and the declassiﬁcation policy “at most one of
the secrets h1, h2 is 1”. The policy releases a relation between h1 and h2 but not
their exact values. Does the program P
def
= l := h1 + h2 satisfy the policy?
Here VH = {0, 1} × {0, 1} and the declassiﬁer, φ, is deﬁned as: φ(∅) = ∅;
φ{〈0, 0〉} = φ{〈0, 1〉} = φ{〈1, 0〉} = {〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉} (i.e., we collect together
all the elements with the same declassiﬁed property) and φ{〈1, 1〉} = VH; φ(X) =⋃
x∈X(φ({x})). A program that respects the above policy should not expose the
distinctions between inputs 〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉 and 〈1, 0〉 at the public output. But it is
permissible to expose the distinction between 〈1, 1〉 and any pair from the partition
block {〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}, because this latter distinction is supported by the policy.
Does P expose distinctions it should not?
To answer, we consider WlpP (l = a), where a is some generic output value. Why
Wlp? Because then we can statically simulate the kind of analysis an attacker would
do for obtaining initial values of (or initial relations among) secret information. Why
l = a? Because this gives us the most general Wlp, parametric on the output value.
Now, note that WlpP (l = a) = (h1 + h2 = a); let Ha
def
= (h1 + h2 = a). Because
a ∈ {0, 1}, we have H0
def
= (h1 +h2 = 0). This allows the attacker to solve for h1, h2:
h1 = 0, h2 = 0. Thus when l = 0, a distinction, {〈0, 0〉}, in the partition block,
{〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉} gets exposed. Hence the program does not satisfy the policy.
So consider a declassiﬁed conﬁdentiality policy, and model the declassiﬁed in-
formation by means of the abstraction φ, of the private inputs, which collects to-
gether all the elements with the same property, declassiﬁed by the policy. Let
Hφ : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) be the corresponding abstraction function. Accordingly, let
X ∈ ℘(Σ) be a concrete set of states and let XL be the L slice of X. Consider
any l ∈ XL. Deﬁne set Hl
def
= {h ∈ VH | 〈h, l〉 ∈ X}; i.e., given an l, Hl contains
all the H values associated with l in X. Then the “declassiﬁed” abstract domain,
Hφ(X), corresponding to X is deﬁned as Hφ(X) =
⋃
l∈XL φ(Hl) × {l}. Note that
the domain, H, for ordinary noninterference is the instantiation of Hφ, where φ
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maps any set to . The analogue of equation (2)
Hφ ◦WlpP ◦H = WlpP ◦H (4)
asserts that (Hφ,H) is F-complete for WlpP . For example, F-completeness fails for
the program P . With X = 〈0, 0, 0〉, we have H(X) = VH×{0} and WlpP (H(X)) =
{〈0, 0, 0〉}. But Hφ(WlpP (H(X))) = {〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉} ⊃WlpP (H(X)).
We are now in a position, via Theorem 5.1 below, to connect Hφ to NI: the
only caveat is that φ must partition the input abstract domain, i.e., ∀x. φ(x) =
{y | φ(x) = φ(y)}. The intuition behind partitioning is that φ’s image on singletons
is all we need for deriving the property of any possible set.
Theorem 5.1 Consider a partitioning φ. Then P satisﬁes noninterference declas-
siﬁed by φ iﬀ H ◦ P  ◦Hφ = H ◦ P .
Together with Theorem 4.1 we are led to
Corollary 5.2 Consider a partitioning φ. Then P satisﬁes noninterference declas-
siﬁed by φ iﬀ Hφ ◦WlpP ◦H = WlpP ◦H, i.e., (H
φ,H) is F-complete for WlpP .
The equality in the corollary asserts that nothing more is released by the Wlp
than what is already released by φ. If F-completeness did not hold, but (Hφ,H)
was merely sound, then Hφ ◦WlpP ◦H WlpP ◦H. In this case Wlp (i.e., the rhs)
releases more information (technically: is more concrete) than that declassiﬁed
(i.e., the lhs). Our goal is not only to check whether a program satisﬁes a particular
conﬁdentiality policy, but also to ﬁnd the public observations that may breach the
conﬁdentiality policy and also the associated secret that each oﬀending observation
reveals. Consider, for example, the following program [7] where l, h ∈ Nats.
P
def
= while (h > 0) do (h := h− 1; l := h) endw
If we observe l = 0 at output, all we can say about input h is h ≥ 0. But with
output observation l = 0, we can deduce h = 0 in the input: the loop must not have
been executed.
Because Wlp relates the observed (public) output to the private (secret) inputs,
therefore, from the ﬁnal observation we can derive the exact secret which is released
by that observation in the following manner: (a) Compute wlp wrt. each observation
obtaining a most general predicate on the input states. (b) Check whether the states
described by the wlp are “more abstract”, i.e., do not permit more distinctions of
private input than those permitted by the policy. If so, there is no breach.
Example 5.3 Consider the following code [22]
P
def
= h := h mod 2; if h = 0 then (h := 0; l := 0) else (h := 1; l := 1);
Let VH = Nats = VL. Suppose we wish to declassify the test, h = 0. Then
φ({0}) = {0} and φ({h}) = Nats  {0}. Thus {h | h = 0}, {0} is the partition
induced by φ on VH and we obtain Hφ = {∅,}∪ {{h | h = 0}×VL} ∪ {{0}×VL}.
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Let Ha
def
= VH × {a}. Consider now the wlp of the program, WlpP (l = a), where
a ∈ VL.
{(a = 0 ∧ h mod 2 = 0) ∨ (a = 1 ∧ h mod 2 = 1)}
h := h mod 2;
{(a = 0 ∧ h = 0) ∨ (a = 1 ∧ h = 1)}
if (h = 0) then (h := 0; l := 0) else (h := 1; l := 1)
{l = a}
Thus, Wlp maps output set of states H0 to the input states {〈h, l〉 | h mod 2 =
0, l ∈ VL}. But this state is not more abstract than the state, {h | h = 0} × VL,
speciﬁed by Hφ: it distinguishes, e.g., (8, 1) from (7, 1) - a distinction not permitted
under the policy. Indeed, consider two runs of P with initial values 8 and 7 of h
and 1 for l; φ(8) = φ(7); yet we get two distinct output values of l.
Example 5.4 Consider P
def
= if (h ≥ k) then (h := h− k; l := l+ k) else skip [22],
and its Wlp semantics. Consider Ha,b
def
= {〈h, l, k〉 | h ∈ VH, l = a, k = b}. Suppose
the declassiﬁcation policy is , i.e., nothing has to be released.
{(h ≥ b ∧ l = a− b ∧ k = b) ∨(h < b ∧ l = a ∧ k = b)}
if (h ≥ k) then (h := h− k; l := l + k) else skip
{l = a ∧ k = b}
WlpP : Ha,b → {〈h, a− b, b〉 | h ≥ b} ∪ {〈h, a, b〉 | h < b}
In this case, we can say that the program does not satisfy the security policy. In
fact, in presence of the same public inputs we can distinguish between values h
greater than the initial value of k, and lower than this value. Note that, in this
case the way WlpP (Ha,b) partitions the private value domain depends also on the
public input. This is not a problem, since by completing the input domain with
these elements we are able to induce a partition of the private domain only. In
this way, Ha,b
def
= {〈h, l, k〉 | h ∈ VH, l = a, k = b} has to be split in the ele-
ments H ′a,b
def
= {〈h, l, k〉 | h ∈ VH, l = a, h ≥ k = b} distinguishing h ≥ k, and
H ′′a,b
def
= {〈h, l, k〉 | h ∈ VH, l = a, h < k = b} distinguishing h < k, and hence the
initial policy  does not guarantee security.
Example 5.5 Consider the Oblivious Transfer Protocol [21], with principals Alice
and Bob. Alice has two messages. Bob knows the messages by name but not by
content. Bob asks for a message by name. But Alice does not know which message
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r0, r1 :∈M ; d :∈ {0, 1};
r := rd;
e := c⊕ d;
f0, f1 := m0 ⊕ re, m1 ⊕ r1⊕e;
m := fc ⊕ r;
Alice Bob
Hid: r; d; c ∈ {0, 1};m m0;m1; r0; r1
Vis: m0;m1; r0; r1; f0; f1; e c;m; f0; f1; e; d; r
The protocol is implemented via a trusted third party, Ted, who sends the random
messages r0, r1 to Alice and the random bit d to Bob. In the implementation (due
to C. Morgan) M denotes the set of messages and ⊕ is xor; the table above shows
what is Hid (“hidden” or H) and Vis (“visible” or L) for Alice and Bob. Bob
randomly chooses bit c and sends Alice e = c ⊕ d. Alice sends Bob f0, f1 whence
Bob can now obtain mc as fc ⊕ r.
If we compute the Wlp we derive that the relations disclosed are f0 = m0 ⊕ r0
and f1 = m1 ⊕ r1 when c = d, and f0 = m0 ⊕ r1 and f1 = m1 ⊕ r0 when c = d.
In both cases, the message mc that Bob can read is combined with the random
message Bob knows (since r = rd and r public to Bob). We can summarize the
Wlp in the following way: fc = mc ⊕ rd and f1⊕c = m1⊕c ⊕ r1⊕d. Hence, f1⊕c tells
almost nothing about the hidden message m1⊕c, expressing only if it is equal or not
with an unknown random message, r1⊕d
4 .
5.2 Deriving counterexamples
Can we mechanize the derivation of counterexamples? That is, can we derive exactly
where the policy fails by demonstrating two input states that break noninterference?
We have advanced the thesis that noninterference is a completeness problem in
abstract interpretation. Ranzato and Tapparo [20] studied completeness in abstract
interpretation from a more algorithmic point of view. They show a correspondence
between completeness and the Paige-Tarjan (PT) algorithm [19] for partition re-
ﬁnement, that derives the coarsest bisimulation of a given partition. Hence, we
have a correspondence between completeness and absence of unstable elements of a
closure wrt. a function f : Given a partition Π ⊆ ℘(C) and f : ℘(C) −→ ℘(C), an
element X ∈ Π is stable for f with respect to Y ∈ Π if X ⊆ f(Y ) or X ∩ f(Y ) = ∅;
otherwise X is unstable. The understanding of completeness in terms of stability
guarantees that if an abstract domain is not complete than there exist at least two
of its elements which are not stable. In our context, f , is Wlp; the element for
which we want to check stability is a set of private inputs in the partition of VH
induced by the declassiﬁer, φ; and the element against which we check stability (Y
in the deﬁnition) is the particular output observation (e.g., l = a).
Proposition 5.6 Unstable elements of Hφ provide counterexamples to φ.
4 We leave a probabilistic analysis of “almost nothing” as future work.
A. Banerjee et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 173 (2007) 47–66 55
Proof. Suppose that ∃l ∈ VL such that (the input states described by) Wlp(Hl) /∈
Hφ. Then there exist x ∈ Wlp(Hl), and h ∈ φ(x
H) such that 〈h, xL〉 /∈ Wlp(Hl).
Note that φ(xH) × {xL} ∩Wlp(Hl) = ∅ since x is in both; and, φ(x
H) × {xL} ⊆
Wlp(Hl) since 〈h, x
L〉 ∈ φ(xH) × {xL} and 〈h, xL〉 /∈ Wlp(Hl). Hence, the abstract
domain Hφ is not stable. To ﬁnd a counterexample consider h1 ∈ φ(x
H)  {k |
〈k, xL〉 ∈ Wlp(Hl)} and h2 ∈ {k | 〈k, x
L〉 ∈ Wlp(Hl)}. The latter set is obtained
by wlp for the output observation l, hence any of its elements, e.g., h2, leads to the
observation l, while all the elements outside the set, e.g., h1, cannot lead to l. 
Example 5.7 Consider the following program with h’s parity declassiﬁed. We can
compute WlpP wrt. l = a ∈ Z, and Ha
def
= {〈h, l〉 | h ∈ VH, l = a}.
{(h = 0 ∧ l = a) ∨ (h > 0 ∧ a = 0)}





H0 → {〈h, l〉 | h > 0, l ∈ V
L} ∪ {〈0, 0〉}
Ha → {〈0, a〉} (a = 0)
Hence, Wlp(H0) = (V
H × {0}) ∪ {〈h, l〉 | h > 0, l = 0}. Thus, all the input states
where l = 0 are not counterexamples to the declassiﬁcation policy. On the contrary,
for any two runs agreeing on input l = 0, whenever h1 = 0 and h2 ∈ Evens  {0},
we observe diﬀerent outputs. Hence, we can distinguish more than the declassiﬁed
partition {Evens,Odds}.
The following example [16] shows that this approach provides a weakening of
noninterference which corresponds to relaxed noninterference. Both approaches
provide a method for characterizing the information that ﬂows and that have to be
declassiﬁed, indeed they both give the same result since they are driven by (para-
metric on) the particular output observation. However, let us underline that the
abstract interpretation-based approach allows also to derive the maximal informa-
tion disclosed independently from the observed public output [17].
Example 5.8 Consider the program P [16] with sec, x, y : H, and in, out : L, where






x := hash(sec); y := x mod 264;
if y = in then out := 1 else out := 0;
z := x mod 3;
A. Banerjee et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 173 (2007) 47–6656
Consider its Wlp semantics where out, in and z are respectively a, b, c ∈ Z:
{(a = 1, out = a,hash(sec) mod 264 = b,hash(sec) mod 3 = c) ∨
(a = 0, out = a,hash(sec) mod 264 = b,hash(sec) mod 3 = c)}
x := hash(sec); y := x mod 264;
{(a = 1, out = a, y = b, x mod 3 = c) ∨ (a = 0, out = a, y = b, x mod 3 = c)}
if y = in then out := 1 else out := 0;
{out = a, in = b, x mod 3 = c}
z := x mod 3;
{out = a, in = b, z = c}
Let us consider ﬁrst P without the last assignment to z and consider the domain
formed by the sets Hin,1
def
= {〈sec, in, out, x, y〉 | in = hash(sec) mod 264, out = 1}
and Hin,0
def
= {〈sec, in, out, x, y〉 | in = hash(sec) mod 264, out = 0}. The set of all
these domains embodies the declassiﬁcation policy since it collects together all the
tuples such that sec has the same value for hash(sec) mod 264. At this point note
that the WlpP semantics does the following associations: Wlp : Hin,a → Hin,a and
this clearly means that the domain is complete, i.e., the declassiﬁcation policy is
suﬃcient to protect the program.
Let us consider now also the last assignment, then we have one more variable
and we redeﬁne Hin,a as sets of tuples containing also z but without any condition
on z since it is not considered in the declassiﬁcation policy. In this case, the Wlp




Hin,1 → Hin,1 ∩
{
〈sec, in, out, x, y, z〉
∣∣∣ hash(sec) mod 3 = z }
Hin,0 → Hin,0 ∩
{
〈sec, in, out, x, y, z〉
∣∣∣ hash(sec) mod 3 = z }
The new elements added to the domain have one more condition on the private
variable sec, which can distinguish further the private inputs by observing the public
output. This makes the initial declassiﬁcation policy unsatisﬁed.
5.3 Reﬁning conﬁdentiality policies
The natural use of the method previously described is for a semantic driven reﬁne-
ment of conﬁdentiality policies. The idea is to start with a conﬁdentiality policy
stating what can be released in terms of abstract domains (or equivalence relations).
In the extreme case, the policy could state that nothing about private information
must be released.
A consequence of Corollary 5.2 is that whenever Hφ is not forward complete
for WlpP , more information is released than what declassiﬁcation φ permits. Thus
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the partition induced on the private domain by φ must be reﬁned by the comple-
tion process. To derive the reﬁned policy, φ′, we perform the following steps: (a)
Consider the domain, Hφ
′
, obtained by completion from Hφ; (b) for each Y ∈ Hφ
′




= {h ∈ VH | 〈h, l〉 ∈ Y }; (c) for each l, compute the partition, πl, induced on








l∈VL πl. The declassiﬁca-
tion policy, φ′, can now be deﬁned as a reﬁnement, R(φ) of φ, by computing the
partitioning closure corresponding to π [14], i.e., the disjunctive completion,

, of





For instance, in Example 5.4, each output observation k = b induces the partition
πb = {{h | h ≥ b}, {h | h < b}}, which is the information released by the single
observation. If we consider the set of all the possible observations, then we derive
π =
∧
b πb = id, namely we have φ = id.
Proposition 5.9 Let φ model the information declassiﬁed. If Hφ ◦ WlpP ◦ H 
WlpP ◦H, then R(φ)  φ, i.e., R(φ) is a reﬁnement of φ, and it is the closest to
φ 5




= h1 := h1; h2 := h1; . . . hn := h1; avg := declassify((h1 + h2 + . . . + hn)/n)
{h1 = a}
h1 := h1; h2 := h1; . . . hn := h1;
{(h1 + h2 + . . . + hn)/n = a}





X → ∅ if ∀a ∈ VL. X = Ha
Ha →
⎧⎨
⎩ 〈a, h2, . . . , hn, a〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣






= {〈h1, . . . , hn, avg〉 | hi ∈ Z, (h1+h2+ . . .+hn)/n = avg = a ∈ Z}. Sup-
pose the input declassiﬁcation policy releases the average of the private values, i.e,
φ(〈h1, . . . , hn〉)
def






n)/n = (h1+. . .+hn)/n}; the policy col-
lects together all the possible private inputs with the same average value. Hence, the
average is the only property that this partition of states allows to observe. Clearly,
the program releases more. Consider n = 4, hi ∈ {1, ..., 8}, and X = H4. The parti-
tion induced byHφ(X) on the states with avg = 4 is {〈5, 2, 3, 6, 4〉, 〈7, 3, 1, 5, 4〉, . . .}.
But WlpP (H4) = {〈4, 3, 7, 2, 4〉, 〈4, 8, 3, 1, 4〉, . . . }. Thus, we need to reﬁne the origi-
nal policy, completing Hφ(X) wrt. WlpP : we add elements WlpP (Ha) for all a ∈ Z.
In each such element, h1 has the particular value a. Formally, the domain, H
φ′(X),
contains all the sets {〈h1, h2, . . . , hn, avg〉 | h1 = avg = a,∀i > 1. hi ∈ Z}; H
φ′(X)
distinguishes all tuples that diﬀer in the ﬁrst private input, where φ′ is obtained as
disjunctive completion of the computed partition and declassiﬁes the value of h1.
5 In theory, this reﬁnement can also be computed as the intersection between the policy φ and the re-
ﬁnement of the undeclassiﬁed policy 	. Eﬃciency comparison between these two approaches is left to the
implementation phase of our work.
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This is the closest domain to φ since, if we add any other element in the resulting
domain, we would distinguish more than what is necessary, i.e., more than the dis-
tinction on the value of h1. Indeed, still abstracting the average of the elements, we
could add other sets of tuples with the same average value, but the only ones that
we can add (i.e, which are not yet in the domain) must add some new distinctions.
For example, if we add sets like {〈4, 6, 1, 5, 4〉, 〈4, 6, 3, 3, 4〉, . . . }, where also h2 is
ﬁxed, then we allow also to distinguish the value of h2, which is not released by the
program.
5.4 Reﬁning Abstract Noninterference policies
The method described for checking and reﬁning a security policy is parametric on
public observations, but one could carry out the same process on properties. If
some information about the execution context of the program is present then we
can restrict (abstract) the possible observations. These restrictions can be modeled
as abstract domains, and therefore by means of abstract noninterference policies.
In particular, it has been proved [10] that the more we observe about public infor-
mation, the less private information can be kept secret. This means that a security
policy, unsafe in a general context, can become safe if we consider a weaker obser-
vation of the public output.
Consider, for example, the following program P with two private inputs x, y,







if(d ≤ x + y ≤ d+ dx + dy ∧ −dy ≤ x− y ≤ dx) then
if(x ≥ 0 ∧ x ≤ d) then xL := d;
if(x > d ∧ x ≤ dx) then xL := x;
if(x > dx ∧ x ≤ dx + d) then xL := dx;
if(y ≥ 0 ∧ y ≤ d) then yL := d;
if(y > d ∧ y ≤ dy) then yL := y;
if(y > dy ∧ y ≤ dy + d) then yL := dy;
Instead of concrete inputs and outputs, we might want to track properties, e.g., in
what interval a particular variable lies. The ﬁgure above represents the input and
output of the program in graphical form: the program transforms an input property,
namely, an octagon (in the private variables x, y, represented by sets of constraints
of the form ±x ±y ≤ c) to an output property, namely, a rectangle (in the variables
xL, yL): Thus if we take WlpP wrt. the property of intervals – this corresponds to
rectangles in the 2-dimensional space – then the WlpP semantics returns an octagon
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abstract domain [18], i.e., we derive an octagonal relation between the two private
inputs. Thus the security policy has to declassify at least the octagon domain in
order to make the program secure.
Moreover, abstract noninterference policies can be useful in order to make the algo-
rithm computable. In fact by abstracting the public domain we can make ﬁnite the
amount of possible observations of the attacker; in practice, this means that when
we compute Wlp(ρ(l) = A) we are guaranteed that there will be ﬁnitely many Wlp
computations whenever the abstract domain is ﬁnite.
This example shows that we can combine (narrow) abstract non interference
[9] with declassiﬁcation in the following completeness equation: Let Hρ
def
= λX.VH×
ρ(XL) [10] and Hφη
def
= λX.φ(Hη(l))×η(l), where Hη(l)
def
= {h | η(l′) = η(l), 〈h, l′〉 ∈ X}
Hφη ◦WlpP ◦Hρ = WlpP ◦Hρ
6 Abstract model checking and information ﬂow
In the previous sections we have seen how we can verify and reﬁne conﬁdentiality
policies that admit some leak of private information. The whole study is done by
considering I/O semantics (denotational and wlp) and modelling DNI as a com-
pleteness problem. On the other hand, the strong relationship between complete-
ness and stability (in the Paige-Tarjan sense) existing in the framework of abstract
model checking (AMC) has been studied [20,11]: the completeness in question is
B-completeness for the post function induced by an equivalence relation on the do-
main of states. Since the denotational semantics is the post for a transition system
where all traces are two-states long – because they are I/O states – a straightforward
generalization of our work and of the notion of noninterference can be obtained via
a generic post function. Hence, two traces are L indistinguishable, i.e, =L, if they
have the same public projection.
Theorem 6.1 Let 〈|P |〉 the standard trace semantics of P (deterministic program).
The noninterference on traces, i.e., ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ.σ1 =L σ2 ⇒ 〈|P |〉(σ1) =L 〈|P |〉(σ2),
holds iﬀ H ◦postP ◦H = H ◦postP , where postP is the post function associated with
the transition system modelling P .
This theorem implies that we can characterize the declassiﬁcation property on
the private information of states also when we have to protect the whole trace seman-
tics from malicious observations. Moreover, the completeness equation, rewritten as
H ◦ p˜re ◦H = p˜re ◦H (via Theorem 4.1), asserts (in the context of AMC) that there
are no spurious counterexamples. In the NI context, this means that there is no
leakage of information. In particular, for declassiﬁcation, if Hφ ◦ p˜reP ◦H = p˜reP ◦H
holds, there is no need to further declassify private information via reﬁnement, even
if we suppose that the attacker can observe every intermediate step of computation.
In the following simple example we show how this approach works by also providing
its relationship with the equivalence relation transformer deﬁned by Zdancewic and
Myers [28] for characterizing leakages of private information. First, we rewrite their
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transformer as follows: Let ≈ be an equivalence relation, we deﬁne σ1 S(≈) σ2 if
and only if ∀i > 0. [posti([σ1]≈)]≈ = [post
i([σ2]≈)]≈. (post
i is the composition of
post with itself i times.) This new equivalence relation, if diﬀerent from ≈, tells
us that something is released. With our method, we can characterize exactly what
is released. When we deal with equivalence relations, the backward completeness
equation for post can be rewritten as [14]: [post[σ1]≈]≈ = post[σ1]≈; and so we are
led to
Theorem 6.2 S(≈) =≈ iﬀ ≈ is backward complete for post.
Example 6.3 Consider the following transition system [28] which uses a password
system to launder conﬁdential information:
〈t, h, p, q, r〉 → 〈t, h, p, q, r〉
〈0, h, p, p, 0〉 → 〈1, h, p, p, 1〉
〈0, h, p, p, 1〉 → 〈1, h, p, p, 0〉
〈0, h, p, q, 0〉 → 〈1, h, p, q, 0〉 p = q
〈0, h, p, q, 1〉 → 〈1, h, p, q, 1〉 p = q
where t ∈ {0, 1} is the time (1 indicates that
the program has been executed), r ∈ {0, 1}
denotes the result of the test (it is left un-
changed if the test of equality between the
password p and the query q fails).
The public variables are t, q, r, hence the partition induced by H is:
〈t, h, p, q, r〉 ≡ 〈t′, h′, p′, q′, r′〉 iﬀ t = t′ ∧ q = q′ ∧ r = r′
The above says we are considering two states that are L indistinguishable (as in
ordinary NI). By checking completeness we characterize the information that can be
released. For example, consider the set of possible input states which are in the same
equivalence class and for which the state 〈0, h, p, q, 0〉 is a representative. Applying
the transition rules, we see (below, left) that this state reveals a diﬀerent public
output. Thus there is a leakage of conﬁdential information. In order to characterize
what information is released we complete the domain H by p˜reP (below, right):
〈0, h, p, q, 0〉 →
⎧⎨
⎩
〈1, h, p, p, 1〉




〈1, h, p, p, 1〉 → 〈0, h, p, p, 0〉
〈1, h, p, q, 0〉 → 〈0, h, p, q, 0〉 p = q
Hence we have to reﬁne the original partition by adding the new blocks 〈0, h, p, p, 0〉
and 〈0, h, p, q, 0〉 where p = q, i.e., we release the information whether p = q or
p = q.
AMC techniques are usually applied to Kripke structures. A Kripke structure
consists of a set of states, a set of transitions between states, and a function that
labels each state with a set of properties that are true in the state. The Kripke
model for a program corresponds to the standard transition system associated with
the program where states are labelled with the values of the variables. The connec-
tion between declassiﬁcation and AMC suggests the use of existing algorithms for
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AMC in order to derive the information released by a system, whenever the con-
ﬁdential information is ﬁxed. Indeed, the existence of a spurious counterexample
in the AMC (abstraction corresponding to the declassiﬁcation policy) corresponds
to the existence of an insecure information ﬂow in the concrete system. Suppose
we interpret the initial abstract domain of a system as a declassiﬁcation policy (the
distinction between all the states mapped to diﬀerent properties is declassiﬁed).
Then whenever an AMC algorithm ﬁnds a spurious counterexample it means that
there is a breach in the security, and hence some more secrets, i.e., some more
distinctions among states, are released. For instance, in the example above, the
given trace (from 〈0, h, p, q, 0〉) would be identiﬁed as a spurious counterexample,
and the reﬁnement for erasing it is exactly the reﬁnement we describe. When no
more spurious counterexamples exist, then we have characterized, in the resulting
abstract domain, the secure declassiﬁcation policy.
7 Discussion
In this paper we exploit completeness of abstract interpretation for modelling non-
interference for conﬁdentiality policies based on declassiﬁcation. Starting with Joshi
and Leino’s semantic formulation of NI [15], it is possible to characterize NI as a
problem of B-completeness for denotational semantics [10]. This paper provides an
equivalent formulation of NI as F-completeness for the wlp semantics, and extends
the formulation to declassiﬁcation. Semantically, we represent a declassiﬁcation pol-
icy as an abstraction of the H inputs that induces a partition on them. A program
that satisﬁes the policy is guaranteed not to expose distinctions within a partition
block. F-completeness formalizes “not exposing distinctions”. The advantage of
our formalization, compared to other approaches, is that we can associate with
each possible public observation the exact secret released. Moreover, the strong
connection between completeness and declassiﬁcation, together with the connection
between completeness and abstract model checking, allows the use of standard tech-
niques in abstract model checking for checking and reﬁning declassiﬁcation policies.
In particular, model checking can be applied to generic ﬁnite state systems, and
abstractions allow to consider even inﬁnite state systems. As future work, we are
studying the practical use of these techniques applied to more complex systems.
The relation between the abstract interpretation approach to NI [9,10] and
many extant approaches for noninterference and declassiﬁcation has been studied
by means of examples [14,17]. Sabelfeld and Sands note that most extant proposals
suﬀer from lack of a compelling semantics for declassiﬁcation. In earlier work they
use the PER model [24] for deﬁning selective dependency [3] by means of equiva-
lence relations instead of abstract domains. They also show, via an example, that
the PER model can be used to show that nothing more is learnt by an attacker
than what the policy itself releases [25]; in our model we derive this formally
(Corollary 5.2) and also show how, in the case where a policy is not satisﬁed, coun-
terexamples may be generated and the policy may be reﬁned. Joshi and Leino [15]
introduce abstract variables in order to obtain a more general notion of security.
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In this case they substitute the private variables with functions, i.e., properties, of
them. This corresponds to abstract noninterference where we ﬁx what we want to
protect instead of what we admit to ﬂow [9,17], hence it is not helpful for comput-
ing what information is released. Da´rvas et al. [7] use dynamic logic to dynamically
analyze the declassiﬁcation property. The information ﬂow property is modelled
as a dynamic logic formula. Next, they ﬁx some declassifying preconditions and
execute the analysis. If the analysis succeeds then there is an upper bound on the
information disclosed; otherwise the precondition must be reﬁned. Because of the
connections of completeness to PT, our approach can provide a more systematic
method for designing and reﬁning these preconditions. Our approach diﬀers from
quantitative characterizations [2,8] of the information released since we provide a
qualitative analysis of the leaked secrets.
In a recent paper, Unno et al. [27] have proposed a method for automatically
ﬁnding counterexamples of secure information ﬂow, which combines security type-
based analysis for standard NI and model checking. Our context is more general,
since standard NI is a particular case of DNI. Nevertheless, as future work, we plan
to investigate whether their approach can be directly derived from ours.
Alur et al. [1] consider preservation of secrecy under reﬁnement and present a
simulation-based technique to show when one system is a reﬁnement of another
wrt. secrecy. They contend that their approach is ﬂexible because it can express
arbitrary secrecy requirements. In particular, if the speciﬁcation does not maintain
secrecy of a property then the implementation does not need to either. Our notion
of reﬁnement is slightly diﬀerent: if a program leaks more information than the
policy, we consider how the policy might have to be reﬁned to admit the program.
It is possible that there might be strong connections to their work and we plan to
explore these connections.
In other future work, we plan to further exploit the strong relation of NI with
AMC and stability. One direction is to implement algorithms for deriving the
maximal amount of information disclosed and for reﬁning declassiﬁcation policies,
by erasing counterexamples. Moreover, the example above shows that it is possible
to combine both abstract noninterference and declassiﬁcation. So existing abstract
model checking techniques can be used not only to derive the amount of information
disclosed, but also to characterize the strongest harmless attacker. Finally, we plan
to extend the framework in this paper to handle heap-manipulating programs.
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A Relevant background
Making abstract domain complete
The problem of making abstract domains B-complete and F-complete has been
solved [12,11]. The key point in these constructions is that both F and B complete-
ness are properties of the underlying abstract domain A relative to the concrete
function f . To make a domain F-complete, one adds all the direct images of f to
the output abstract domain; to make a domain B-complete, and one adds all the
maximal of the inverse images of the function to the input domain. (see Fig. A.1).
In a more general setting let f : C1 → C2 be a function on complete lattices C1
and C2, and ρ ∈ uco(C2) and η ∈ uco(C1) be abstract domains 〈ρ, η〉 is a pair of
B(F)-complete abstractions for f if ρ ◦ f = ρ ◦ f ◦ η (f ◦ η = ρ ◦ f ◦ η). In any
case the idea of making a domain complete is to add all the direct images of the
concrete function to the output abstract domain for F-completeness, and to add
all the maximal of the inverse images of the function to the input domain for B-













Fig. A.1. Making F and B complete.
generic function f : C1 −→ C2 by using the following operations:









Let 	 ∈ {F ,B}. In [12] the authors proved that the most abstract β  η such that
〈ρ, β〉 is 	-complete, i.e., given ρ ∈ uco(C2) the 	-complete shell of η ∈ uco(C1), is
R,ρf (η)
def
= η Rf (ρ).
The Paige-Tarjan algorithm
The Paige Tarjan algorithm is a well known algorithm for computing the coarsest
bisimulation of a given partition. Consider a relation R such that f = pre(R). The
algorithm is provided below, where P is a partition, PTSplitR(S,P ) partitions each
unstable block in P wrt. R with B ∩ f(S) and B  f(S), while PTRefinersR(P ) is






Partition obtained from P by replacing











while (P is not R-stable) do
choose S ∈ PTRefinersR(P );
P := PTSplitR(S,P );
endwhile
Fig. A.2. A generalized version of the PT algorithm.
This algorithm has been shown to be a forward completeness problem for the
function f [20].
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